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THE CANONS OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION
For many centuries the bar of the Anglo-Saxon world
has been the object of a more or less merited distrust by
laymen. The consciousness of this distrust has in recent
years grown somewhat acute, and one of the results of
this has been, an effort, on the part of certain state bar
associations, and of the American Bar Association to improve the standard of conduct of the profession. Realization of this improvement has been sought, not by any serious investigation into the antecedents of those who apply
for admission to the bar, -butin the invention of a body of
so-called "canons", observance of which is to be expeccect
by those who have already become members of the bar.
Many of these "canons", devised doubtless with comnlendable intentions will on examination, be found inadequate
to accomplish any proper end.
The initial committee on the subject, was appointed
by the Association in 1905, and after prolonged deliberation, it reported. This report was after some discussion
adopted on August 27th, 1908. It contains a preamble,
and 32 so-called canons, which are followed by the form
of an oath of admission which the courts or legislatures
of the states are recommended to exact from those who
are about to be admitted to the bar. It is not the purpose
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of the writer to examine all these canons. A few of them
however merit -more than a passing attention.
THE PREAMBLE

The preamble lays down the proposition that in America, (meaning, probably, that part of North America
commonly called the United States) the stability of all departments of government rests on the approval of the people. It is then, argues the preamble, "peculiarly essential
that the system of justice be highly efficient, and that the
public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of its administration. Justice must be pure
and unsullied. That it cannot 'be unless the conduct and
the motives of the lawyers merit the approval of all just
men. That the 120 lawyers who enacted this preamble
had a reasonably high sense of their own importance in the
body politic composed of one hundred millions of people
is indisputable.
CANON 1.

The first duty is to be respectful to the court. Why?
"Not for the sake of the temporary incumbent," but "for
the maintenance of its supreme importance." This is an
implied assertion that the judicial office is of supreme importance. It is of vast importance. But, of vaster than
congress or legislature? of President or Governor? The
constitution recognizes three (often called) co-ordinate
divisions of the government. It does not rank one above
the other. If the judiciary has exalted itself above the
others, it has done so, with the aid of the lawyers, by an
The judges are a
illegitimate arrogation of importance.
branch of the administration of the country, and nothing
makes it as such, more necessary, than are other branches.
It is too much the fashion of some lawyers to make themselves and the judges that come from among them into
a caste, and to semi-divinize themselves.
The canon, in further explanation of its enactment,
proceeds to say that judges are not wholly free to defend
themselves "from unjust criticism and clamor." In this
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they are like presidents and governors and legislators, and
incumbents of all the offices.
In this licentious age,
all official personages are subject to criticism, often ignorant and malicious. The judges are the only officers who
can hale their critics before themselves, decide on the demerit of their objections, and punish it by fines and imprisonments or deprivation of their profession.
The
history both in England and the United States, of the judiciary does not support the suggestion that it is not abundantly able to defend itself not merely from unjust, but
at times from just criticism.
But, a canon is a rule of conduct. What is the lawyer
to do, to maintain the "supreme importance" of the courts?
Nothing more than to maintain towards them a "respectful attitude." That courts may sometimes do wrong, is
tacitly conceded, but it is a wrong only to the lawyer. If
he has grievances, he may submit them to the proper authorities. But suppose the judge is drunken, or otherwise criminal, or indolent and neglectful of his duties.
Suppose he is guilty of rank injustice. May the lawyer
think those qualities "grievances," and may he make charges founded on them? Apparently, all the short comings
of the judge must be kept within the breast of the attorney, unless he has a grievance. He dissociates himself
from his fellow citizens. He considers in the behavior of
the judge, only its effect on his own professional success,
reputation, and emolument, not plainly a very lofty attitude for a citizen to maintain.
CANON 2.

The second canon considers the part to be taken by
lawyers in the selection of judges. They should prevent
political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness.
Outweighing where? In their own minds and votes, or in
those of their fellow citizens? Is the judicial candidate
to be voted, for without any reference to his being a democrat, republican, prohibitionist? If reference hereto is
allowable, as the canon seems to concede, the lawyer must
see that the weight he attaches to the politics of the can-
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didate, while it may exist, and even equal the weight attached to "judicial fitness," shall not 'outweigh" this
latter consideration.
But, the lawyer should watch the candidates, and if
he finds any of them "unsuitable for the Bench", he should
earnestly and actively protest against the appointment or
election of them. How? Mu,5t he go into the newspapers,
during the election? Must he circulate and obtain signatures to written criticism of the candidates?
The only reprehensible quality of a judge adverted
to, is the readiness, while in office, to pursue other gainful employments, whether business or political, or other
(not which may consume time and thought that should be
devoted to the public, but) which might "embarrass their
free and fair consideration of questions before them for
decision." How lawyers are to be able, better than others
to foresee that candidates, if elected; will thus "embarrass
their free and fair consideration," is not suggested.
It is to be noted, that the canon declares it to be the
"duty of the Bar" to do the things above described. What
Bar? Of the state?
Of the county? And is this duty
one resting only on the Bar, and not on each and all of the
component members? If a public spirited lawyer unsuccessfully endeavors to persuade the "Bar" to twork against
the election of a bad man, has his duty ended?
Then comes apparently a duty which indisputably
rests on the individual lawyers. They should impartially
estimate their own sbility to "add honor to the office" of
judge, and should not seek the office unless they possess
this ability.
The adopters of this canon, seem obsessed with the
notion that the business of people is to "add honor" to
things. A man becomes a judge. He is sensible, honest,
just, as far as the law and juridical usages allow 'him to
be. Is he "adding" honor to the bench, or is he simply
not subtracting -honorfrom it?
or rather is he doing the
things he is appointed to do, as he is expected to do them?
This anxiety to add honor to things must strike the judi-
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cious as juvenile. If a practical truism had to be expressed in a phrase, why did the 120 lawyers not say that a
lawyer should not seek to become a judge, simply for the
He
distinction which the office would bring to him.
should impartially believe that he could do the judge's
work well. What matters it to a serious man whether doing his work well, does or does not "add honor" to the
place, the office, in which he does it?
CANON 3.
The third canon prohibits lawyers, not relatives or
special friends of the judges, from showing "marked attention" and unusual hospitality towards them. It forbids private communication with the judge, -oncerning
pending causes. The lawyer must not attempt to gain
from a judge special personal consideration. These as
much involve duties of the judges, as duties of attorneys.
The attorney does not give hospitality to the judge, unless
the judge receives it.
CANON 4.
A lawyer appointed by the court to defend an indigent
prisoner, ought not to decline for any trirvial reason. The
older lawyers with much business, are not usually selected
Is it the poverty of
by courts for this unrequited task.
that
imposes
this
duty,
or the deference
the man in trouble
to the judge who has selected the lawyer? and who may
suffer a certain embarrassment, if the lawyer declines?
If the duty is a branch of the general duty to assist
the poor in want o rtrouble, it is hard to see why it should
not be the duty of the attorney to defend men in civil
actions when their cause is just, or even. to prosecute suits
for them as plaintiffs when property or money is unjustly
The- preservation of liberty is only
withheld from them.
one of the necessaries of men, and in civil actions for torts,
the defendant runs the risk of the loss of this liberty.
The duty imposed by the 4th canon is therefore, probably
more a duty toward the court than toward the poor defendant.
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CANON 5.

This canon states a doctrine, as well as a duty. It is
the right of the lawyer, it affirms, to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused. The value
of an opinion depends on the man who forms it, and the
evidence upon which it is based. Suppose the attorney to
have had the confession of the accused, or to have seen him
perpetrate the crime. May he then undertake to defend
the accused? The canon says, if -the lawyer cannot defend, regardless of his opinion, innocent persons victims
ef suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper defense. But, suppose it is clear that the accused is not the
victim of circumstances. It is one thing to affirm that a
lawyer may defend the possible victim of circumstances;
and another to say that, being an experienced, prudent, attorney, knowing how to weigh evidence, he may nevertheless defend one whom he for adequate reasons, believes

guilty.
In the oath, the form of which is recommended for
adoption by the American Bar Association, the applicant
for admission to the bar says: "I will not x x maintain
x x x any defense except such as I believe to be honestly
debatable under the law of the land." If the defense is,
I did not do the act, to believe it to be honestly debatable,
means, if anything, not to believe in the defendant's commission of the act, or it means, although I believe the prisoner guilty, I also believe that the evidence producible by
the prosecution and defense will be such that it can be
plausibly debated before the jury, in, such way that they
may be put into doubt, and so will necessarily acquit. If the
former interpretation is to be placed on its words, the
oath senems inconsistent with the doctrine of the 5th Canon.
If the latter, the attorney, in acting in conformity with it,
virtually makes himself an accessory after the fact, to the
felony (if of felony the defendant is accused) and for a
motive less honorable than that which usually instigates
such accessoryship (viz friendship for the principal felon)
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for the motive namely, of a desire to win a fee, or the renown of forensic victory.
Even so good a man as the late Judge Sharswood, ot
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in dealing with this
topic, falls sensibly below the standard of integrity and
high-mindedness which he usually defends. The prisoner,
be argues (Legal Ethics p. 106) is in every case entitled
to have the evidence carefully sifted, the weak points of
the prosecution exposed, the reasonable doubts presented,
which should weigh in his favor. "And what offense to
truth or morality," he asks "does his advocate commit in
discharging that duty to the best of his learning and ability?"
The advocate believes, knows, that his client is
guilty of an atrocious murder.
He nevertheless undertakes to defend him.
He will by cross-examination or
otherwise weaken in the mind of the jury, -the evidence
against the prisoner which he nevertheless knows to be
-true and from which the only sound inference is that the
prisoner is guilty. He will plausibly argue from circumstances, to awaken doubt in -the untrained or ignorant intelligence of the jurors, of facts which he himself knows to
be facts. He does this, simply because he is paid for doing it, or because his professional reputation for success,
requires it. His -act is nevertheless an upright and innocent one! The unsophisticated conscience of the layman has
never accepted, and probably never will accept this apology
for conduct most baneful to the state, and instigated by the
most sordid of motives. It is the conduct of lawyers in
prosecuting and defending causes known to them to be bad,
on the pretext that every man has a right to have the evidence- carefully sifted, etc., and the apology for such conduct offered by the most respecfable of the legal profession, that have perpetuated the odium which attaches to the
bar. When Swift described advocates as "a society of
men bred from their youth in the art of proving by words
multiplied for the purpose, that white is black, and black
is white, according as they are paid," when Macaulay asks
whether it be right that "not merely believing but know-
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ing a statement to be true, the advocate should do oIl that
can be done by sophistry, -by rhetoric, by solemn asseveration, by indignant exclamation, by gesture, by play of
feature, by terrifying one honest witness, by perplexing
another, to cause a jury to think that statement false,"
the -bar should well understand that the sophisms by which
these tergiversations and falsehoods, these virtual alliances with promoters of unjust claims, with even the most
wicked criminals, are excused, have not impressed, save
with disgust and weariness, the unspoiled intelligence of
the non-legal world. The records of great advocates, almost without exception are tainted. Their fame has been
built up by chicanery, falsehood, hypocrisy.
They have
basely prostituted their powers to the misguidance of
judges and jurors, in order, often, to assist clients to accomplish the most shocking injustices, in order to set adrift
on society, the most hardened and ferocious-criminals. Not
untrue are the remarks of the -historian, W. H. H. Lecky.
"The master of advocacy will rarely confine himself to a
calm dispassionate statement of the facts and arguments
of his side. He will inevitably use all his powers of rhetoric and persuasion to make the cause for vlhich he holds
a brief appear true, though he knows it to be false. He
will affect a warmth which he does not feel and a conviction which he does not -hold. He will skilfully avail himself of any mistake or admission of his opponent, of any
technical rule that can exclude damaging evidence-all the
resources that legal subtlety and severe cross-examination
can furnish to confuse dangerous issues, to obscure or
minimise inconvenient facts, to discredit hostile witnesses.
He will appeal to every prejudice that can help -his cause.
He will for the time, so completely identify himself with
it that he will make its success his -supreme and all-absorbing object, and he will hardly fail to feel a -thrill of
triumph, if -by force of ingenious and eloquent pleadings
he has saved the guilty from punishment, or enacted a
verdict in defiance of the evidence."
When guilt is clear to the attorney, his undertaking
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to wrest from an unsuspecting jury a false verdict of nbt
guilty, can surely be tolerated by an unperverted conscience, only when every element of sordid consideration
is absent from his mind, only when, in other words, he
To conrenounces all expectation of pecuniary gain.
sciously set a criminal free for money by misguiding the
jury, is at least as bad as to rescue him from the penalties of
the law by concealing him, by conveying -him stealthily beyond the state, by offering a false scent to the officers
who are on his trail. The defences of such conduct, that
come only from the legal profession, reveal the extensive
demoralization which it has undergone, during centuries
of virtual irresponsibility.
The 5th Canon concludes with an admonition to prosecuting attorneys. Their "primary duty", says the canon,
The
"is not to convict but to see that justice is done.
suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable
of establishing the innocense of the accused is highly repHere appears tenderness towards persons
rehensible."
Eiccused of crime, so characteristic of many lawyers, of socalled criminal lawyers. The uninitiated would have suppoged that "secreting witnesses" and the "suppression of
facts" would be unworthy whether in civil or criminal
cases, whether on the part of plaintiff or prosecutor, or
on the part of the defendant. These acts it was worth the
while of the Bar Association to condemn only when committed by the state's attorney. Was it because there is
something in that office, that makes the hitherto upright
and honorable advocate false and base enough to attempt
even by improper means, to convict the innocent?
The American Bar Association undertakes to say
what the duty of a certain attorney towards his client is.
The state is the client of the District or State's attoriey.
Where is the authentic proof that the state hires him not
The state
to convict, but to see that justice is done?
provides for the employment by the accused of counsel,
sometimes undertating to furnish counsel at its own expense, or at the expense of the county. Does it really ex-
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rect its prosecuting attorney in addition to do the work
of the defendant's attorney? Why should the former not
be understood to do the best he can, to convince the jury
of the guilt of the accused, leaving to the attorney of the
latter, the function of exposing the weakness of the state's
case, and of disclosing the exonerating evidence?
If it is true that the state expects its attorney not to
strive to convict an innocent man, why does it not expect
the attorney for the defendant not to strive to acquit a
guilty man? While it is concerned that the innocent shall
be convicted, is it not likewise anxious that the .guilty shall
not be acquitted? Yet it seems, if the Association's ethics
expresses the expectation of the state, that attorneys, who
in a sense, are officers of the state, may work for the
acquittal of men whom they believe, with the best reason,
that is, whom they know, to be guilty, while the state's attorney must not work to convict a man whom he knows
or believes to be innocent. His duty, alone of attorneys,
is to see that justice is done. All other attorneys are to
see that' their respective clients win, whether they be
plaintiffs or defendants, and whether, if defendants, the
case against them is criminal or civil, and whether they
ought to win or not!
But who is it that has commissioned the 120 attorneys that enacted the Canons of ethics, among whom were
not a dozen from Pennsylvania, to state for Pennsylvania
what she employs her attorney-general and her district
attorneys to do when they institute prosecutions?
CANON 7.

The value of this canon it is hard to realize. A client suggests to his attorney the employment of additional
counsel.
This, we are told, should not be regarded as
evidence of a want of confidence, but the matter should.
be left to the determination of the client! Of what can
the suggestion be evidence, if not of want of confidence
in the knowledge or skill of the already employed counsel; in his physical strength, in his alertness and diligence
in his capacity to bring influence to bear on court or jury?
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Surely, a desire to reinforce the attorney must underlie
the suggestion.
But, the canon seeks to create a duty on the part of a
lawyer to decline employment, if the taking of additional
counsel is disliked by the lawyer already employed! That
is, the lawyer already employed is to have the power to
prohibit the employment of any body in addition. Strange
to say, however, the lawyer can be dismissed altogether by
the client, in order to employ a second! What astonishing
ethical finesse in these prescriptions!
T1'he canon forbids efforts, direct or indirect, to encroach in any way, on the business of another lawyer.
Such efforts are unworthy, says the canon "of those who
should be brethren at the bar." A certain amount of legal
business exists in every county. What lawyer A gets of
this business, lawyer B does not get. Any act of lawyer
A, his industry, skill, learning, fidelity, superiority of talent, by which "inany way" he gets business, is in a sense,
an "encroachment" upon the business of others. Surely
it is not forbidden. What it is to "encroach" is unfortunately not made clear. However, one mode of encroachment is permitted. The client of attorney A, may be dissatisfied with 'him. He may apply to lawyer B, to take
the business already committed to A, -and B may supersede
A, '"generally after communication with" A. What he is to
say in this communication, is not revealed. Will it exIlain the client's complaints in extenso? Will it curtly
iotify A, that he is cashiered, in favor of B? Alas! that
the ethics of this impressive subject should be so vague.
CANON 8.

The lawyer should hear fully the client's case before
advising him-that is, he should not be a fool, in forming
opinions on a complex matter, without knowing what it
is. He should also give a candid opinion of the probable
results of litigation, that is, he should not deceive his client, in order to inveigle the latter into furnishing him the
opportunity to charge fees. If litigation can, be averted
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by a "fair adjustment," it should be advised against.
CANON 9.

This canon forbids the lawyer to communicate with
the opposite party.
He must have dealings only with
that party's attorney. He should not attempt to negotiate the matter with this party. Sometimes the controNersy could be adjusted, but for the ignorance, cupidity,
or other worse qualities of the attorney.
The opposite attorney, however clear this may be, must leave his
own client and the client's antagonist, in the hands of the
other attorney however corrupt or ignorant. What courtesy will often require, when no superior consideration
negatives, is thus turned into a universal rule.
CANONS 10 and 13.

Canon 10 says that the lawyer should not purchase
any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
he is conducting. Why? His client wants to sell an interest; he knows as well what the value of the interest is, as
would the attorney. Yet the attorney may not buy it! Will
owning an interest lessen, will it not increase his zeal and
industry in the conduct of the litigation? The lawyer can
form a better judgment of the chance of success in the suit,
than the client. He will be at times, under a temptation
to minify this chance to his client in order to induce a sale
at a low price. But, is there to be a universal prohibition
of a class of acts, because in some of them, there would be
apt to be fraud?,
The right to a contingent fee is virtually a right in the
thing which is the subject of litigation. Patten v. Wilson,
34 Pa. 299. A sues B for damages for a personal injury.
A employs X as an atorney, agreeing to let X have one
third or one fourth of the sum recovered. Yet, the 13th
Canon does not forbid contingent fees. It says that, where
sanctioned by law, they should be under the supervision
of the court, in order that clients may be protected from
unjust charges.
Where is here the precept, the canon?
Is it the duty of attorneys, before agreeing to take con-
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tingent fees to apply to a court for its consent? Does the
canon do any thing more than by implication suggest that
contingent fees should not be "unjust charges?"
The
enforceableness of a contract for a contingent fee has been
recognized in this state.
Perry v. Dicken, 105 Pa. 83.
Sharswood, in his Legal Ethics, p. 160, deprecates the
practice of stipulating for such fees. His chief objection
seems to be that the contract deepens the lawyer's interest
in the success of the litigation. How deep may this interest legitimately be? His reputation as a successful attorney ,is already at stake. Even in the absence of a contract for a fee conditioned on success, he knows that he will
be able to demand and his client willing to pay a higher
compensation, if he succeeds, than if he fails. The supposition that if he sues for that in which he has an interest, "he
will cease to consider himself subject to the ordinary rules
of professional conduct. He is tempted to make success, at
all 'hazards and by all means, the sole end of his exertions,"
is fantastic. The ordinary lawyer, alas! feels so, whether
his fee be conditioned on success or not. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that the practice of the law has
been, despite the professions of some of its members, other
than simply a business, and into doubting that, as those
who pursue other businesses the lawyer wants gains, wants
the reputation which will bring him more business and
more gains. As he would rather work than be idle, he is willing to accept suits, and take the risk of going without compensation for his labor therein unless it proves successful.
CANON 12.
Canon 12 deals with compensation. It is a duty, apparently of lawyers not to undercharge, -as well as not t:
overcharge. They should "avoid charges which overestirmate their advice and services, as well as Those which undervalue them." It is not often that the attorney needs instruction as to his duty in fixing fees towards himself. The
aftorney is told that charges may be excessive, even when
the client is able to pay them. It seems that the lawyers
are to consider themselves as a fraternity, and that the
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"reasonable requests" of '"rother lawyers," and of their
widows and orphans without emple means, should receive
kindly consideration. This canon is interesting, in that it
specifies six things which may he considered in fixing the
fees, -among which are the ordinary charges of lawyers for
similar services, the amounm involved, and the benefit resulting from the service, the contingency or certainty of the
compensation and, the frequency or infrequency of employment by the same client.
The place that such economic
suggestions have in a code of ethics, is hard to discover.
They furnish no rule. Indeed the inventors of the canon
admit that these considerations are "mere guides in ascertaining the real value of -theservice."
Following this dissertation on modes of estimating
fees, is the naive suggestion, "In fixing fees it should
never -be forgotten that the profession. is a branch of the
administration of justices and not a mere money-getting
trade." The lawyers that did not become such, in order to
earn money, must be very scarce. None of them are visible
above the horizon. It is pleasant for them to hold in vivid
remembrance, the distinction between a "profession" and a
"trade," and to recall constantly, that they are not in a
'mere money-getting trade," nor in any trade at all. There
would be a flavor of hypocrisy in the assertion that they
were not in a "money-getting" profession. The ordinary attorney would think it fTntastic idealism really to believe
that the chief end of the practice of law was not to confer
on him good money compensations, with the social distinction annexed to the business. One of the duties that the
Association has omitted to inculcate is the avoidance of
corporate and individual pharisaism.
CANON 15.

The 15th canon brands as false, the claim that it is the
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to win
his client's cause. The great trust of the lawyer, is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law.
He is not for his client to violate the laws, or engage in
any manner of fraud or chicane. The lawyer must obey his
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It sometimes
own conscieice and not that of his client.
happens that the lawyer's conscience is better than that of
the client, but, alas! the desire to win in too many cases,
displaces conscience in both attorney and client.
It is rather startling to find imbedded in this canon
a precept which seems wholly disconnected from its setting.
"It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client's innocence, or in the justice of his
cause." Why? Untruly to assert it, would be a lie. Is it
a question of the admissibility of opinion evidence or a quesThe attorney's opinion
tion of ethics, that is involved?
may as an opinion, be incompetent, and the lawyer should
iot inject incompetent evidence into a cause, but is it "unWhat dimensions are
ethical" for him to express it?
strangely given to the conception of ethics!
In canon 15 occurs the statement "In the judicial forum
the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy and
There are a few lawyers who will refuse to
defense."
serve a client in taking advantage of the statute of limitations, when the debt is unpaid, and the client admits that
it is. This degree of scrupulosity seems to be condemned
by the American Bar Association. Other men are expected
if they are respectable to be better than the law compels
them to be. The law allows various acts of deception which
Honesty forbids a debtor's taking
sound morals forbid.
sdvantage of the forbearance or the neglect of his creditor,
by refusing to pay his debt, but it is apparently the duty
of the attorney to abet him, when he makes up his mind
to cheat his tolerant creditor, by pleading the statute of limitations.
The statute of frauds, too, has, possibly, as has been
said, caused more fraud than it has prevented. A is induced by C to lend $1000 to his son or brother B, by his, C's
verbal promise to repay it. A thinks not of the statute of
B
frauds. He trusts C's promise and makes the loan.
fails to repay it. C is requested to keep his promise and
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refuses. He is advised by his attorney that hd can escape
because A trusted his pledged oral words merely and did
not insist on a writing. C, it seems, is entitled to this advice from his attorney, and the -attorney is under a duty to
resist in court a recovery because A had too much confidence in C's honor. That C made the promise may be undisputed. He may confess to have made it. Nevertheless
he -has a legal defense, and the lawyer not only may but
must, aid him in making it. Does this really express the
morality of the American Bar Association? If C denied
that he made the promise, and the attorney believed the
denial, his availing himself of the statute would not be
abhorrent. But the maxim of the Association makes it the
right and duty of the attorney to avail himself of it, although the client unblushingly admits that he procured
the loan, treacherously by means of an oral promise which
he had no intention to keep, and with knowledge of A's ignorance or oblivion of the statute, or his guileless confidence
in C's honor!
CANON 19.

This canon allows the attorney to testify for his client
as to "merely formal matters, such as the attestation or
custody of an instrument, and the like." As to other matters, if he is to be a witness he should "leave the trial of
the case to the other counsel." Except when essential to
the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in
court in behalf of his client. The testimony as to "formal
matters," is testimony to matters essential to success. Why
essential testimony, if "formal", may come from the attorney, and he may continue to conduct the trial, but if not
formal, may not, a discriminating casuistry is needful to
discover. But, why should the lawyer not testify generally? He himself uses without scruple the testimony of his
client, who is more deeply tinctured with bias, and whose
veracity may be more justifiably suspected. Why is he not
to testify himself? Will he more probably impose on the
jury? Will 'he more likely perjure himself than the ordivary 'witness? Will the jurors not have sagacity enough to
allow for this? It would be indelicate for him, in his argu-
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ment, to enlarge on the unbelieveableness of the witness
whom he has contradicted and on his own believeableness,
but it does not follow from his testifying that he must likewise comment on his testimony. Why has a -general principle been laid down, on this topic, when the endlessly varying circumstances of cases, make an invariable rule impracticable?
CANON 22.
If there was any serious reason for laying down the
prohibitions of canon 22, the moral character of the bar
must be at a desperately low stage. Among these things
is misquoting the contents of a paper, the testimony of a
witness, the language of the opposing counsel, or of a textbook or decision. Not less shocking, is citing as authority,
a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been
repealed. Possibly less grave is asserting as a fact, what
has not been proved or concealing in the opening argurient, so as to avoid possible confutation, points which are
to be made in the final argument. It is a wholesome statement that evidence should not be offered which, counsel
knows, the court should reject, in order to get it before the
jury in argument for its admissibility. It must be remembered however, that nearly all evidence is admissible, if
the opposite party does not object, and the offer must often be made, before it can be known whether objection will
be made.
CANON 23.
This canon condemns attempts to curry favor by fawning, flattery, or pretended solicitude for the comfort of
the jury. It wisely says that suggestions looking to the
comfort or convenience of jurors, should be made to the
court, out of the juror's hearing.
CANON 26.
This canon recognizes that a lawyer, as such, may render professional services before "legislative and other bodies," in regard to proposed legislation, and in advocacy of
claims before departments of government. He must however, let his attorneyship be known. The Association does
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not seem to have derived from this function of the attorney, the duty of maintaining towards the legislative or
other bodies, or departments, of a respectful attitude, for
the "maintenance of their supreme importance." If lawyiers
can maintain the supreme importance of the courts, why can
they not that of the legislature and of the executive
departments? Why has the Association modestly limited
the Atlantean function of the bar, to the maintenance ot
the supreme importance of the courts?
CANON 28.
This canon avers that "the counsel upon the trial of
a cause in which perjury has been committed, owe it to the
profession and to the public, to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities." The amount of
perjury committed in the courts, is appalling, and much of
it is encouraged by attorneys. Some, many of them are
the suborners of perjury on a colossal scale. It is a pity
that the canon does not -takenote of subornation of perjury,
as well as of perjury itself. If lawyers should advise the
prosecuting authorities, of their various machinations and
devices to procure testimony that is untrue, the number of
subornation of perjury prosecutions would be portentously
enlarged and not a few of the smuggest and most respectable members of the profession would be defendants. But
subornation has escaped the notice of the legal canonists;
a most inexplicable instance of blindness to one of the
most sinister facts in connection with the administration
of justice.
CANON 29.
One of the most pointless of the doctrines of the canons,
is that thus expressed; "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust." An advertisement is the establishment of
a reputation! The lawyer needs to have his existence, and
his profession, known. Shall he take steps consciously to
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create this knowledge? Shall he put out a sign? Shall he
put a card in the newspaper? Shall he ask friends to disperse the information of his whereabouts? and o fhis capacity? Business cards are, it seems, permitted. Soliciting
business by advertisements or circulars, or by personal Interviews, is unprofessional.
Procuring laudatory news.
paper comments is also disapproved. All forms o selflaudation "defy the traditions and lower the tone of our
high calling and are intolerable."
CANON 32

Entirely wholesome is the doctrine of the 32d canon.
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor
any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled
to receive, nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are,
or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to
uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercisng
a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of
the public. When rendering any such improper service or
advice the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation. The canon concludes with the assurance. "But
above all, a lawyer will find his highest -honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public
duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen." The only regrettable matter to be noted here, is
that the appeal is made not to the conscience for rectitude,
of the attorney, but to his lust for a reputation for fidelity.
The important thing, is, not to be honest and honorable,
but to be honest and honorable in order to win the reputation of being so.
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MOOT COURT
KEMP v. LEWIS
Landlord and Tenant-Constructive Eviction-Covenant Not to Lease
Premises to Competitors
OPINION OF THE COURT
YATES, J. This is an action of assumpsit by a landlord against
his tenant for rent. One Kemp leased to Lewis, the defendant, a store
room, in a building, and covenanted not to let any other storeroom
therein, to be used in the same business, selling drygoods. In violation of the covenant, Kemp leased another room to X, for the
dry goods business, and X opened a store for the sale of drygoods
tberein. Lewis thereupon moved out and refused to pay rent accruing since his removal.
Was this breach of covenant by the lessor an eviction sufficient in law to Telease the defendant from his liability to pay for
the rent accruing thereafter? This is the question we are now
called upon to answer.
It is settled by the current of authority that an eviction of a
tenant by the landlord of demised premises suspends the rent. The
reason of this rule is well stated in Baron Gilbert's Treatise on
FRents:-"A rent is something given by way of retribution to the
lessor for the land demised by him. to the tenant, and consequently
the lessor's title to the rent is founded upon this: that the land demised is enjoyed by the tenant during the term included in the
contract; for the tenant can make no return for a thing he has not.
If therefore the tenant can he deprived of the thing letten, the obligation to pay rent ceases, because such obligation has its force only
from the consideration, which was the enjoyment of the thing demised." Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322.
Tiffany in his work on Real Property writes, "An eviction by
the landlord may be either by actual dispossession of the tenant or
it may be what is usually called a 'constructive' eviction. To consitute such a constructive eviction, that is an eviction not involving
an actual ejectment of the tenant, there must be some act of a permanent character done by the landlord with the intention and effect
of depriving the tenant of the full enjoyment of the premises, to
which the tenant yields. This intention constituting the act of eviction, is however, but seldom directly shown and is inferred from the
character of the act itself. The tendency of modern decisions is to
hold that any act or default by the landlord which deprives the ten-
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ant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, followed by the tenant's abandonment thereof, will constitute an eviction."
This view is supported by a number of Pennsylvania cases: McSorley v. Allen, 36 Sup. 271; Weighley v. Muller, 51 Sup. 125;
Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322; and the same view is apparently
taken in other jurisdictions as is shown by Halligan v. Wade, 21 Ill.
470; Skally v. Shute, 132 Pa. 367; and Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Vt. 109.
The Pennsylvania cases say that under modern authorities a constructive eviction is sufficient to destroy the relation of landlord
and tenant. The term "eviction" is no longer restricted in its application to its original, meaning of eviction by title paramount, or to
the total deprivation of the premises by the landlord. Any act of
the landlord which deprives the tenant of that beneficial enjoyment
cf the premises to which he is entitled under the lease, will amount
in law to an eviction.
The following excerpt is from 24 Cyc. 1129: "The general rule
is that in order to constitute an eviction there must be not a trespass merely by the landlord, but something of a permanent character
to deprive the tenant of the use of the demised premises or of some
part thereof. However it is not necessary that there should be manual or physical expulsion or exclusion from the demised premises, or
,any part thereof, to constitute eviction. An eviction may be actual
where there is a physical expulsion, or it may be constructive, which
altho an eviction at law, does not deprive the tenant of actual occupancy. There can be no constructive eviction without a surrender
of possession of the premises by the tenant. Any interference by the
landlord with his tenant's right to the enjoyment of the premises to
the full extent secured by the lease authorizes the tenant to abandon the premises and exonerates him from the payment of the rent."
Do these debts show the defendant to be so exonerated from
payment of the rent? Was Lewis justified in leaving the premises
cn the breach of the covenant by Kemp? We have come to the conclusion that he was. Kemp expressly covenanted with Lewis that he
would not rent another room in the same building for the same business. He placed himself in the position, voluntarily, where he knew
that he would be doing wrong in breaking the eovenant. The plaintiff contends that the defendant had his action on the covenant for
damages. and was therefore not justified in leaving the premises.
But how would the jury assess such damages as these sustained in
this case? It is no slight injury in the present day conditions of business, to have an ambitious and industrious business man competing
'vith you, always ready to injure you in any manner whatever that
will insure to, him more business than his competitor. The profits
lost by having a neighboring competitor of such a kind are merely
conjectural and can not be adequately estimated by a jury. And
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when the landlord expressly covenants to protect his tenant from
such competition, he should not be allowed to endeavor to hold the
tenant to his part of the contract when he himself has not performed his half. We therefore render judgment in favor of the
defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The freedom from competition of a dealer in the same business, in the same building, was evidently a very important consideration for Lewis, when he accepted the lease. The ordinary remedy
for the breach of a covenant by the landlord, is an action thereupon
for damages. The learned court below very plainly exposes the
inadequacy of the remedy, on account of the impossibility of showing to what extent the tenant's business is lessened by the presence
of a rival store in the same building.
It is possible sometimes, to treat the covenant as descriptive of a
condition. It would not be unreasonable so to construe this lease
as to make the duty of continuing to retain possession and to pay
the rent, dependent on the continued performance of the covenant not
to lease another room for the dry goods business. Cf. University
Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 106 N. E. 790, where a lease, similar to
that before us, was so treated; 28 Howard Law Review, p. 522.
When the landlord violated his promise, he authorized the tenant to
withdraw from the premises, and to refrain from paying more rent.
The learned court below has treated the action of the landlord,
followed by an abandonment by the tenant of the possession, as an
eviction. An eviction suspends, during its continuance, the duty
of paying rent. While literally an eviction is an. improper deprivation of the possession, whereby the tenant's expected enjoyment of
the premises is reduced or destroyed, that enjoyment may be reduced
cr destroyed without literal dispossession, and when it is so reduced
or destroyed and in consequence, the tenant withdraws also from -the
possession, he will often be regarded as having been evicted. Assaults of the tenant followed by his vacation of the premises have
been deemed an eviction, in Weighley v. Muller, 51 Sup. 125. Failure of
the landlord to furnish heat and light according to his contract, was
an eviction; McSorley v. Allen, 36 Super. 271; Cf. Schienle v. Eckels,
227 Pa. 305. The landlord's refusal to remove a building previously on
the boardwalk at Atlantic City to the boardwalk after its former position had been abandoned, was said in Jackson v. Farrell, 6 Super, 31.
to warrant the tenant's surrender of the possession, and his relief
from further rent. Destroying a part of a building, in which the
leased premises were, with the effect of diminishing the number
cf the tenant's customers, was held an eviction. Conlon v. McGraw,
66 Mich. 94. A similar result was announced, in Coulter v. Norton,
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100 Mich. 389, where a tenant of a cigar stand in a hotel was held
evicted by the closing of the hotel. Lessening the availability of a
part of a building, let as a hotel, by leasing other portions for a saloon, was called an eviction in Hallligan v. Wade, 21 IlL 470.
In Tucker v. Dupuy, 210 Pa. 461, a physician took a lease of offices in a building. Subsequently, the lessor's grantee of the reversion altered the rest of the building into a hotel, and interfered with
access to the offices, whereupon the tenant brought an action for
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Approving a judgment
for the defendant, on a demurrer to the statement, Fell, J.. mentions
that "There was no express agreement to rent the rest of the building for offices only, and none can be implied from the relation and
duties of the parties." In the case before us, there was an express
covenant with respect to the letting of the rest of the premises.
The able opinion of the learned court below well sustains the
conclusion reached by it, and the judgment is affirmed.
SANASON v. FAIRVIEW
Negligence-Liability of Father For Son's Default-Automobile as
"Dangerous Instrumentality"
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant's
17 year old son, while driving the defendant's 60 horse power automobile. The son habitually drove the car with his father's consent
ond at the time of the accident, was driving it with his father's consent, but entirely for his own pleasure.
Clark, H., for plaintiff.
Howard, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BURKE, J. The question to be decided in this case is whether
the relation existing between Fairview, the owner of the automobiTe, end the driver of it, his son, was such as would make Fairview
lI'able for the injury %sustainedby Sanason, in consequence of the
son's negligence.
The mere fact that the defendant was the father of the driver of
the machine is not in itself such a relation as will place responsibility upon him. In volume 29 Cyc. 1665, we read:--"At common law
.lis well established that the mere relation of parent and child imposes upon the parent no liability for the -torts of the child committed without his knowledge, or authority, express or implied."
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Brown, in his work on Pennsylvania Negligence, Vol. 2, page
1043, says:--"A person is not liable for the acts or negligence of
another, unless the relation of master and servant or of principal
end agent be established between them." Allen v. Willard, 57 Pa.
374.
We must therefore determine whether there existed between
father and son, the relation either af principal and agent, or of master and servant.
An agent is one who undertakes to transact some business or to
manage some affair for another, by the authority and on account of
the latter and to render an account of it. Vol. 1, Bouvier's Law Dic.
p. 116. In the present case, the son undertook no business of the
defendant's, nor did he manage any affairs for him by driving the
car. The son was not, then, the agent of the defendant.
Let us now determine whether there was a relation of master
and servant. A person is deemed a master who has the superior
choice, control, and direction of the servant, and whose will the servant represents, not merely in the ultimate result of the work, but
in the details.
A servant has been defined to -be (1) a person employed to
Iebor for the pleasure or interest of another, especially in law, one
employed to render service or assistance in some trade or vocation;
but without authority to act as agent in place of his employer; (2)
an employee; (3) a person hired to assist in domestic work. 26 Cyc.
965.
It is very evident that the son was not employed to labor for
the pleasure or interest of his father. On the contrary, he was driving the machine exclusively for the pleasure he himself derived
from it. That he was not an employee is equally true. Nor was he
hired to assist in domestic work. He was acting in pursuit of his
own pleasure rather than working for anyone.
The doctrine contended -by the learned counsel for the plaintiff
amounts to this: That the pleasure of the family in its utmost detail is the business of the father.
In the case of Parker v. Wilson, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, the court
said: "To hold that the son in the pursuit of his own pleasure with
an automobile owned by his father, was engaged in the business of
the father is a doctrine, we think, which has no foundation in reason
or common sense. In theory it overlooks well settled principles of
law; in practice It would interdict the father's generosity, and his
reasonable care for the pleasure or even the well-being of his
children by imposing a universal responsibility for their acts."
In the case of Bard and Wenich v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 482, the son was
driving a team of his father's when injuries were received by the
plaintiff due to the son's negligence and the defendant was not held
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liable, although he assented to the son's using the team for his
own benefit. The court said: "When a person employed by one as a
servant, is using the team of his master, for his own purposes and
benefit, and in the absence of and without any directions from the
master, uses the team so negligently as to occasion injury to a third
party, the master is not liable for such injury although he assented
to the servant's using the team for his own benefit." In this case,
the son was a hireling of the father's, and still the father was not
held liable.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff cites two Pennsylvania
cases where the owner of the machine was held liable. The facts,
however, are not analogous to those at bar.' In Moon v. Matthews,
22T Pa. 488, the driver of the automobile was a licensed chauffeur,
in the employ of the defendant and in Strohl v. Levan, 39 Pa. 177,
the son was driving a team of horses but the father was riding with
the son, at the time the plaintiff was injured. In the latter case
the father by his presence approved of the acts of his son and thereby incurred liability. The doctrine of these cases cannot be considered in deciding the case at bar, because of the great difference In
the facts.
Between Fairview and his son, therefore, the relation of nster
and servant did not exist.
The next question is: Was the defendant negligent in permitting his son to operate the automobile? We think he was not. By
statute in Pennsylvania, a boy 16 years of age may operate a motor
vehicle, and in the case at bar the defendant's son was 17.
An automobile is not a dangerous instrument, and the father
was not negligent in allowing his son to operate it. Parker v. Wilson, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87; Smith v. Jordon, 211 Mass. 269; Knight
v. Lanier, 74 N. Y. Supp. 999; Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49.
The son drove the machine habitually and it is reasonable to
infer that he -was competent to drive it on this occasion. Should
Fairview be held responsible for his son's negligenc. in operating
the machine, when he had no reasonable grounds to anticipate an
accident? To hold him responsible would be unjust and contrary
ti. the great weight of authority. Judgment is therefore given for
the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Until the adoption of the automobile as a common vehicle of
transportation, the ordinary rules of master and servant were considered sufficient to determine the liability of an owner of a vehicle
of transportation for injuries caused by its negligent use by another.
For reasons perhaps not clearly conceived, and surely not
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clearly stated, many courts have deemed it expedient to hold the
owner of an automobile to a stricter accountability than that imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The question is most frequently presented for determination in
cases where an injury was occasioned by a "family automobile"
while operated by a member of the family other than the owner, and
in these cases an accountability greater than that resulting from
the doctrine of respondeat superior has been contended for, and,
.n some cases, imposed.
It
Various theories of responsibility have been propounded.
has 'been seriously contended that the owner is liable by reason of
his ownership alone, bit this doctrine has been uniformly rejected
l'y the courts.
The so-called doctrine -of "dangerous instrumentalities" has likewise been frequently and almost uniformly rejected by the courts.
Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338; Parker v. Wilson,
(Ala.) 60 South 150, contra; Hays v. Hogan (Mo.) 165, S. W. 1125.
Another theory which may be described as the "family automobile" theory has received recognition in several courts. According
to this theory where a father purchases an automobile for use by
the members of his family for the purpose of pleasure, he is liable
for the negligent operation of the mchine by any member of the
family so using it. The basis of this doctrine is that the automobile
is, under such circumstances, being used for one of the very uses
for which the father kept it; that it is a pleasure machine and when
used for pleasure by one of the children it is being used in the business of the owner. Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W.
351; Stone v. Morris, 47 Ky. 386; Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S. C. 487;
Birch v. Abercombie, 74 Wash. 486.
In other jurisdictions this doctrine has been expressly repudiated. Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754, 71 Alt. 296; Maher v. Benedict, 108 N. Y. S. 228; Parker v. Wilson (Ala.) 60 South. 150; Linville v. Missen, 162 N. C. 95, 77 S. E. 1096; Schumer v. Register, 12
Ga. App. 743, 78 S. E. 731.
It has been asserted on one hand, that the "family automobile
theory" is based on "reason and authority," and, on the other, that
it has "no foundation in reason or common sense." Whether it or
the opposite doctrine is "callously technical and little short of calamitous" is a question upon which there seems to be a serious conflict of decision which finds expression in a number of well considered and well written opinions.
After a perusal of all of the opnions in which this question has
bceen considered, we are persuaded that the so-called "family
automobile" theory should not be adopted. If a father entrust an
automobile to a very young or incompetent son, he may well be held
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liable because of his own negligence. But where the son is compos
mentis (except as afterwards shown by the joy ride) the father
should not be liable. The agency relationship is difficult to conceive and the idea of vicarious enjoyment is far too fanciful. "Qui
facit per auto facit per se" is not a maxim of the law.
COMMONWEALTH v. SARAH MULLINS
Murder in the First Degree by Poison-Accessory to Suicide-See. 74,
Act -of March 31, 1860
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Mullins was confined to his bed, unable to move. Among
other medicines he used mineral waters which were placed daily near
his bed by Mrs. Mullins, who. was his nurse. He was very despondent and averred on more than one occasion that he would take his
life, were he able. On one occasion Mrs. Mullins placed arsenic,
which Mr. Mullins had purchased before his sickness, on a stand
near the bedside. She brought it there on a tray which contained
the mineral waters and along with the arsenic were the mineral
waters which were to be used that day. Mrs. Mullins did not mention the poison, in :act, she did nothing-simply placed the tray
on the stand and left the room. Mr. Mullins took the poison, which
resulted in his death that day. Mrs. Mullins is to be tried for murder in the first degree.
Schneller, for the Commonwealth.
Royal, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McGUIRE, J. Murder as defined at common law is "unlawful homicide with malice aforethought." Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, art.
223. The words "malice aforethought" are used here in a very vague
sense. They may mean any one of six different situations; but,
there is only one which we will deal with at present. Malice aforethought may exist when the defendant knows that his act
is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, altho he has
no actual intention to injure any person, and may wish the contzary. Clark's Criminal Law, page 190.
The 7,4th section of the Act of March 31, 1860, reads: "All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in w'ait,
or any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder in the first degree, etc." This section if any is applicable to the
case at bar.
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The section above quoted classes murder by poisoning with
"other" wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and it is implied
that only such poisoning is murder of the first degree as is committed with knowledge, that the article given is a poison and that as
such it will probably kill, and with the intention that it will kill.
Trickett's Criminal Law, page 769.
If the poison was delivered by some one else, or taken by the
deceased without delivery, the felonious intent would be equally accomplished and the g'nilt the same. Com. v. Earle, 1 Wharton 525.
When poison is administered unlawfully, and without any good
intention, and death ensues, the law will presume that the killing
was intentional and voluntary and with malice aforethought, and it
will be murder in the first degree. State of Iowa v. Wells, et al., 61
Iowa 629.
A homicide by administering poison, with intention of mischief
and for an unlawful purpose, with knowledge of the danger to human
life, altho without intent to kill, is murder at common law, and
under the statute murder in the first degree. State y. Wagner, 78
31o. 644. The statute on this point in Missouri is precisely the same
as that in Pennsylvania.
If poison is wilfully administered, if purposely administered,
that is, if it is administered with knowledge that it will be likely
to kill, and with the purpose that it shall kill, the crime is murder
in the first degree. Trickett, Criminal Law, page 770.
In the famouh English Gore case, Mrs. Gore had mixed poison
with an electuary provided by a druggist, which she bought for the
purpose of killing her husband. The electuary was subsequently
returned to the druggist, and to demonstrate that the electuary was
harmless, as he supposed, he took some of it, from which he died.
In this trial the judge ruled, that Mrs. Gore was guilty of murder
for the law couples the event with the intent, and the end with the
cause, Beale's Cases, 209. The learned counsel for the defendant
argues that Mr. Mullins's act is one of suicide, and suicide not being
a crime in Pennsylvania, the accomplice cannot be punished with
more severity than the principal. The court is unable to agree with
this contention, as it would be a travesty on justice to permit this
woman to escape simply because the unfortunate suicide is beyond
the pale of the law.
One who advises another to commit suicide, and is present when
the act takes place is guilty of murder. Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass.
356.
When one gives poison to another in order that the deceased may
take it, and the latter takes it in his presence, the party is guilty of
nrurder. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 165.
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To furnish poison to another, for the purpose and intention that
the person to whom it is delivered shall commit suicide therewith,
the poison being taken by the suicide for that purpose, and resulting
in death, makes the party furnishing the same a principal in
the first degree. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 165. The consent of
the deceased, the free co-operation of the deceased, does not exempt the adviser, aider and abettor from the guilt of murder.
"The half-crazy, despondent, suffering, hopeless man may well be dispunishable for his act, directed to himself while the other who counsels or assists him should be the Mzibject of the sternest condemnation." Supra.
It is our conclusion, that the acts of the defendant taken all
together are such as justify us in rendering a verdict of murder in
the first degree.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Self killing is not a crime in Pennsylvania. In former times
England, Massachusetts, and possibly other states, attempted to censure it. The self killer being dead, his poor body was desecrated.
He was denied Christian burial. His remains were interred, not
in a consecrated churchyard or cemetery, but in some highway, and
heaps of stones or other contrivances were erected to apprise the
profane in passing, that the corpse of the self-killer was below
them. This method of dealing with suicide was prompted by the
reflection that a poor wretch to whom life had lost its attractiveness,
would be seriously deterred from self-murder, by the anticipation of
the contumely with which his dead body would be treated by the
of
governby the officers
crowd, instigated
ignorant
ment. It was much easier to desecrate a dead body than to lend
succour to it living, when needy, or hope to its despairing possessor,
and in this better way, lessen the motive for death.
As men have grown civilized, the state has abandoned these
puerile styles of vengeance, and left the act of self-killing, or of
attempt at self-killing, without punishment.
The statute which prohibits murder can not be extended to embrace self-murder, without absurdity.
A difficulty is presented, when the effort is to punish one who
advises, commands, a-sists another to kill himself. If self-killing
is no crime, how can one who advises it be guilty as principal of
the 2d degree or as accessory before the fact? At common law the
accessory could not be convicted, until the principal had been convicted. It would follow that, when self-killing was not a crime, and
there was no other principal than the deceased, no one could be an
accessory to it. "There is no guilty principal, and there cannot,
therefore, be an accessory." 1 McClain, Crim. Law, p. 169.
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The Aeb of June 3d, 1893, 1 Stewart's Purdon 1049, concerning
the punishment of accessories provides that every principal in the
2d degree or accessory before the fact to any -felony punishable under any act. of assembly of this commonwealth, for whom no punishinent is provided, shall be punishable in the same ;nanner as the
principal in the first degree is by such act punishable." But, as
no act of assembly punishes the suicide, no accessory before the fact
or principal of the 2d degree would under this statute be punishable,, when there was no principal other than the suicide himself.
The Act of March 31st, 1860 § 74, 1 Stewart's Purdon, p. 1043,
says that any person who becomes an accessory before the fact to.
any felony, whether at common law or by statute, may "be indicted,
tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were a principal felon." The suicide himself is not a principal felon; and if he
were, he is not punishable at all.
Perhaps the principle may be applied, that when A procures B
to do an act which would be a felony, and B is irresponsible because
of ignorance, insanity, etc., since B is not guilty A will be treated as
the only principal though he is not present when the deed is commitled. Says Wharton, 1 Crim, Law, p. 225 (10th edition): "A party,
also, who acts through the medium of an innocent or insane medium
cr a slave, is guilty, though absent, as principal in the first degree,
while he would be guilty only as accessory before the fact at comnon law, were the agent a responsible and conscious confederate.
* * ** If therefore, a child under the age of discretion, or any other
person excused from responsibility for actions by defect of understanding, ignorance of the fact, or other cause, be incited to the comndmssion of murder or any other crime, the incitor, though absent
when the act was committed, is ex necessitate liable for the act of
his agent, and a principal in the -irst degree."
We hold, then, that since the self-killer is not responsible, the
instigAtor, etc., of the act, though absent when it is committed, must
be treated as the only principal; as the killer.
The defendant put arsenic within the reach of the deceased
knowing of his desire to commit suicide. The jury could properly
infer that she intended that he should take it and kill himself, if he
vvished. He did take it, and died.
The learned court below has not considered whether the killing
by the defendant, should be deemed malicious and therefore murder, or non-malicious, and therefore only manslaughter.
It can hardly be said that, however pure his motives, one has
a right to assist another to death, by providing him with the means.
The time may come (perhaps, under the influence of the stupendous
war in Europe, is at hand) when respect for human life will be
deemed a superstition, especially, when the man being racked with
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incurable pain, or his estate being irreparably destroyed and he reduced to abject misery, continuance in life appears to him and to the
fe.w that really care for him, as an enormous calamity. When that
time comes, those who help the desperate to a euthanasy, may be
deemed merciful and kind. But that time -has not yet come. A few
more months of barbarous and barbarizing exploits by the belligerents must precede its advent.
But, are we not now prepared to see that the most sacred emotions of love and pity, may urge one man to put an end to the distressful existence of another? And when A, influenced by these
sentiments, assists B to the solacing sleep of death, must we say
that his act is malicious? If A, made angry, suddenly kills his
offender, the law "mercifully" says his act is not malicious, and the
homicide is not murder, but only manslaughter. Shall less be said
for a killing, which does not spring from a self-regarding passion,
but from kindness, pity, love? We think the jury ought to find
whether the element of malice existed in the act of the defendant,
end that it should have been informed that malice could not be inferred simply from the fact of aiding the deceased to kill himself.
Reversed with
We must therefore reverse the judgment.
v. f. d. m.
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BOOK REVIEW
Wles of Law for Churches. Rulings by the Civil Courts Governing Religious Societies, by G. M. Boush, of the Pennsylvania Bar,
Attorney for the Board of Home Missions of the Reformed Church
in U. S. Cleveland, Ohio, Central Publishing House, 1915, pp. 215.
This book is a collection of decisions by the state and federal
courts on the rights, powers and duties of religious societies, their
n.embers and judicatories and their property rights. The purpose
of making this collection appears to have been to enable those connected with any religious organization "to readily find what they
need for their guidance in the -xercise of their duties and the maintt.nance 4of their rights and privileges." The writer has departed
from the usual form of law book. There are no chapters. There
are no section headings nor anything to indicate the subject under
discussion at any point. Great care seems to have been taken to
prepare a minute index and doubtless this remedies the defect referred to. The book contains a table of the cases cited. We know of
no other recent work on religious corporatibns lnd a compact hand
book of this kind should meet a wide demand from church trustees
and their counsel.

